🖥️
Windows DFIR
  • Introduction
  • Windows Artifacts
    • Windows Quick Tips
      • Windows Command Line
      • Workstation File/Folder Locations
      • Server File/Folder Locations
    • Account Usage
      • Authentications SAM Artifacts
        • Last Login
        • Last Failed Login
        • Last Password Change
      • Authentications (Windows Event Log)
        • Logon ID
      • Group Membership
        • Event ID: 4798
        • Event ID: 4799
      • RDP
        • Source System Artifacts - Quick Reference
        • Destination System Artifacts - Quick Reference
      • SSH
      • Rouge Local Accounts
      • CrowdStrike Searches
        • Event Name - UserLogon
        • Event Name - UserLogonFailed
        • Event Name - UserLogonFailed2
        • Event Name - SsoApplicationAccess
    • Browser Usage
      • History & Downloads
        • Viewing History Files - DB Browser
        • Transition Types
      • Auto-Complete Data
      • Bookmarks
      • Browser Preferences
      • Cache
      • Cookies
      • Extensions
      • Super Cookies (HTML5 Web Storage)
      • Media History
      • Private Browsing
      • Session Restore
      • Stored Credentials
      • Suggested/Frequent Sites
      • DB Browser Queries
        • Firefox
        • Chrome
        • Media History
      • PowerShell Scripts
        • Browser Extension Finder
        • Browser History Finder
    • Processes
      • at.exe
      • explorer.exe
      • lsass.exe
      • lsaiso.exe
      • PuTTy.exe
        • X11 Forwarding
      • runtimebroker.exe
      • services.exe
      • smss.exe
      • System
      • svchost.exe
        • Services
      • winlogon.exe
      • wininit.exe
    • Cloud Storage
    • Deleted File or File Knowledge
      • WordWheelQuery (Win 7+)
      • ACMRU (Win XP)
      • Internet Explorer file:///
      • Last Visited MRU
      • Thumbs.db (Win XP)
      • Thumbcache
      • Recycle Bin
      • User Typed Paths
      • Windows Search Database
    • File Download
      • Zone.Identifer
      • Open/Save Most Recently Used (MRU)
      • Email
      • Drive By Downloads
        • Malvertising
      • Web Browsing
        • Cache Files
      • CrowdStrike Searches
        • MoTW
    • Folder/File Opening/Creation
      • Recent Files
      • Office Recent Files
      • Shell Bags
      • .lnk Files
      • Jump Lists
        • AppIDs
      • Prefetch
      • Index.dat file://
      • PowerShell Scripts
        • .lnk Files
    • Persistence
      • Registry
        • NTUSER.DAT & HKU\SID
        • Run and Run Once
        • Shell Folders and UserInit Key
        • Services
        • Logon Scripts
        • Office Add-ins
        • Winlogon Shell
        • Image File Execution Options (IFEO)
        • AppInit_DLLs
        • Scheduled Tasks
      • Scheduled Tasks
        • Scheduled Task Destination System Artifacts
        • Scheduled Task Source System Artifacts
      • Startup
      • Tool: AutoRuns
      • Accounts
      • WMI Event Consumers
        • WMI: Source System Artifacts
        • WMI: Destination System Artifacts
        • WMI: PowerShell Analysis
      • PowerShell Scripts
        • Startup Programs
      • CrowdStrike Searches
        • Files Written to Startup Folder
        • Files Written to Startup Folder from the Internet
        • Local Account Creation/Deletion
        • Azure Account Creation/Deletion
        • Scheduled Tasks
    • Physical Location
      • Time zone
      • Wireless SSID
      • Network History (Vista/Win7–11)
      • Cookies
      • Browser Search Terms
    • Program Execution
      • Prefetch
        • Decoding Prefetch Files with Eric Zimmerman's PECmd Tool
      • BAM/DAM
      • CapabilityAccessManager
      • UserAssist
      • Last Visited MRU
      • RunMRU
      • MUI Cache
      • ShimCache
      • Amcache
      • Jump Lists
    • Shadow Copies
      • VSC Permissions
      • Event ID 8193: Volume Shadow Copy Service Error
    • USB Usage
      • Key Identification
      • Drive Letter and Volume Name
      • Connection Timestamps
      • User
      • Volume Name
      • Plug & Play Event Log
    • Windows Services
      • DoSvc (Delivery Optimization)
    • System Information
    • Event IDs
      • Authentication / Account
        • 4624 - Authentication Success
          • Logon Types
        • 4625 - Authentication Failure
          • SubStatus Codes
        • 4634 - Account Logoff
        • 4648 - Explicit Credentials Success
        • 4672 - Special Privileges
        • 4720 - Account Creation
        • 4722 - Account Enabled
        • 4732 - Addition to Local Group
        • 4738 - Account Changed
        • 4776 - Kerberos Authentication Attempt
          • Substatus Codes
        • 4771 - Kerberos Failure
        • 4768
      • File System
        • 1006
        • 4688 - Process Created
        • 4663
        • 4656
        • 6416
        • 20001
        • 20003
  • Windows DFIR & MITTR
    • Initial Access
      • Content Injection
      • Drive-by Compromise
        • Watering Hole Attack
        • Microsoft Files (Payload Execution)
        • Exploit Delivery
        • Viewing Browser History Files
      • Phishing
    • Execution
    • Persistence
    • Privilege Escalation
    • Defense Evasion
    • Credential Access
      • Logon ID
    • Discovery
    • Lateral Movement
    • Collection
    • Command and Control
    • Exfiltration
    • Impact
  • SOC Related
    • Cached Credentials
    • Domain Controller Password Spraying
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On this page
  • Overview
  • Abuse by Threat Actors
  • Detection and Mitigation
  • Example of a Suspicious Entry
  • Conclusion

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  1. Windows Artifacts
  2. Persistence
  3. Registry

AppInit_DLLs

The AppInit_DLLs registry key provides a mechanism for specifying one or more DLLs to be loaded into all processes that use the User32.dll.

Overview

  • Registry Location: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_DLLs

  • Purpose and Use: Originally designed to allow developers to load custom DLLs into the address space of all processes that load User32.dll (essentially, any application with a GUI), this feature can be used to implement global hooks, extend or modify GUI functionality, and for other legitimate system-wide enhancements.

Abuse by Threat Actors

  • Process Injection: Malware can use the AppInit_DLLs mechanism to inject malicious DLLs into all processes that load User32.dll, which includes most applications with a graphical user interface. This broad injection scope makes it a potent vector for widespread compromise.

  • Persistence and Stealth: Malicious DLLs loaded via AppInit_DLLs are executed each time a GUI application starts, providing a method for persistence. Because this behavior is part of a legitimate Windows feature, it can be more difficult to detect and differentiate from normal system operations.

  • Privilege Escalation: If a process that loads a malicious DLL via AppInit_DLLs runs with elevated privileges, the malicious code within the DLL can potentially execute with those same elevated privileges, leading to privilege escalation.

Detection and Mitigation

  • Registry Monitoring: Continuous monitoring of the AppInit_DLLs registry key for unauthorized changes is crucial. Any addition to this key should be scrutinized and validated.

  • Security Software: Use security solutions that specifically check for and alert on modifications to AppInit_DLLs, as well as other methods of process injection. Advanced endpoint protection platforms often include behavioral analysis that can detect the anomalous activity associated with DLL injection.

  • Software Restriction Policies: Implementing software restriction policies and application whitelisting can help prevent unauthorized DLLs from being executed, even if they are specified in the AppInit_DLLs registry key.

  • Least Privilege Principle: Running applications and services with the least privilege necessary can help limit the potential impact of malicious DLLs loaded through this mechanism.

Example of a Suspicious Entry

A potentially malicious modification to the AppInit_DLLs key might look like this:

[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows]
"AppInit_DLLs"="C:\\Windows\\System32\\malicious.dll"

In this example, malicious.dll would be loaded into every application that uses User32.dll, executing its payload in the context of multiple processes across the system.

Conclusion

While AppInit_DLLs was designed for legitimate customization and extension of Windows functionalities, its potential for abuse by malware makes it a significant security concern. Protecting against threats exploiting AppInit_DLLs requires a combination of vigilant system monitoring, robust security practices, and the implementation of preventive security controls. Awareness of this and similar mechanisms within Windows is essential for maintaining system integrity and security.

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Last updated 1 year ago

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